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Michael MacNeil*

Collective Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Charter Cathedral: Union Strategies in a
Post-BC Health World

For the first twenty-five years after the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was
enacted, it appeared that it would have little impact on Canadian labour laws. The
Supreme Court of Canada took the view that the guarantee of freedom of association in
the Charter did not include a right to strike and did not provide protection for collective
bargaining. Common law rules regulating picketing did not come within the scope of
the Charter's rules on freedom of expression. Academic commentators were divided
on whether this was a good or a bad thing, some espousing the hope that the Charter
could be applied inpursuit of greater justice inthe workplace while others were thankful
that the courts were not interfering with legislative formulation of collective bargaining
law and policy Slowly, however, the courts have come to a different view of the Charter,
finding that its values serve to provide protection for picketing, and in a sweeping
revision of former jurisprudence in 2007 holding that the guarantee of freedom of
association does provide protection for collective bargaining. This article describes
the changing judicial views of the Charter through three distinct periods, each roughly
a decade long: the formative period, the period of consolidation, and the period of
re-assessment. It also traces some of the academic reaction to these developments.
It concludes by an assessment of how trade unions are attempting to harness the
changing view of the Charter to pursue a variety of challenges to the existing legislated
collective bargaining schemes in Canada. In doing so, the paper uses the metaphor
of the Charter as a cathedral, with the judges and academic commentators as artists
painting a variety of views of the Cathedral. It is only through assessing the multiplicity
of views that one can hope to achieve even a partial understanding of the Charter's
role in Canadian labour law
Pendant les vingt-cinq premidres anndes qui ont suivi l'adoption de la Charte
canadienne des droits et libertds, il a semble qu'elle n'aurait que peu d'incidences
sur les lois canadiennes sur le travail. La Cour suprdme du Canada estimait que la
garantie de libertd d'association prdvue dans la Charte ne couvrait pas le droit de
faire la gr6ve et n'offrait pas de protection pour la negociation collective. Les rdgles
de common law en matibre de piquetage n'etaient pas visdes par les dispositions de
la Charte sur la liberte d'expression. Les observateurs du milieu universitaire 6taient
partagds sur la question de savoir s'il s'agissait dune bonne ou dune mauvaise
chose; certains exprimaient Iespoir que la Charte puisse 6tre appliqude dans Ia
poursuite d'une meilleure justice en milieu de travail, d'autres 6taient simplement
reconnaissantsque les tribunaux ne s'immiscent pas dans la formulation par le pouvoir
Iegislatifdes lois et des politiques en matibre de negociation collective. Les tribunaux
en sont toutefois lentement venus 1 adopter une opinion diffdrente de la Charte et
ont conclu que ses valeurs servent 6 offrir une protection pour le piquetage, et en
2007, s'dcartant remarquablement de la jurisprudence existante, i/s ont conclu que la
garantie de liberte d'association confdre une protection pour la ndgociation collective.
Cet article ddcrit I'dvolution de la jurisprudence en ce qui a trait &la Charte pendant
trois poriodes, chacune etant 6 peu prds dune ddcennie : la pdriode formative, la
periode de consolidation et la pdriode de rddvaluation. l y est aussi question de la
reaction de certains auteurs et observateurs j ces developpements. L'article conclut
sur une dvaluation de la fagon dont les syndicats tentent de profiter du changement
de point de vue sur la Charte pour poursuivre diverses contestations des rdgimes
de ndgociation collective qui existent actuellement au Canada. Ce faisant, I'article
considdre mdtaphoriquement la Charte comme une cathddrale, les juges et les
observateurs du milieu universitaire 6tant des artistes qui en peignent chacun une
vue diffdrente. Ce n'est quen procedant 1 un examen de la multiplicito de vues que
Ion peut espdrer comprendre, ne ft-ce que partiellement, le rdle de la Charte en droit
canadien du travail.
Department of Law, Carleton University. Updated Version of a Paper Presented at the Inaugural
Innis Christie Symposium in Labour and Employment Law, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie
University, Halifax, NS, 23 October 2010.
*
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Introduction'
In a famous article written in the 1970s, 2 Guido Calabresi and Douglas
Melamed emphasized that their view of a unified theory of property and
tort law was but one view of the cathedral. They referred to Monet's
many paintings of Rouen Cathedral, commenting that to understand
the Cathedral, one must see all of the paintings. The Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms3 is a cathedral, and the voluminous academic,
professional, judicial and quasi-judicial commentary on what the Charter
means and what it protects, fails to protect or should protect is a series of
paintings, each of which provides but a limited perspective on the greater
whole.

I. I wish to thank the organizers of the Innis Christie Symposium in Labour and Employment Law,
especially Bruce Archibald, for inviting me to participate at the symposium. Innis Christie taught me
Labour and Employment Law at Schulich School of Law, and taught me much about law, integrity,
and the research process in those courses and in a summer when I worked as his research assistant
as he was writing his seminal text on Employment Law. I also want to thank the participants at the
seminar who provided me with much to think about, and Roy Adams who provided helpful comments
on the paper.
2.
Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, "Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral" (1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089.
3. CanadianCharterofRights and Freedoms, Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule
B to the CanadaAct 1982 (UK), 1982, c II [Charter].
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I acknowledge at the outset some problems with the metaphor. Others
have argued that the Charteris "only paper, dead tree, with ink on it" 4 and
so ascribing to it cathedral qualities may be overemphasizing its grandeur
and influence in the legal sphere. However the cathedral metaphor may
serve to remind us just how little influence the Charterhas in relation to
social and political spheres, akin to the decline of churches as spheres of
influence in modem society. The connecting of the Charter to Monet's
paintings of Rouen Cathedral also serves another purpose. It has been said
that it was not really the Rouen Cathedral that Monet painted in his series,
but rather it was the light. His views of Rouen Cathedral were really a view
of light over time, and the particular view of the Charterthat I attempt to
paint in this paper is really a view of the changing discourses about the
Charter, whether originating from the courts or from scholarly academic
and professional writing.'
It is of course unlikely that viewing all the Chartercathedral paintings
would indeed lead us to a complete understanding of the Charter cathedral,
and I do not propose to subject you to viewing all of the available
paintings. Nevertheless, I will provide a view of some of them, especially
relating to trade unions and collective bargaining, showing that different
people see different things at different times even when purporting to be
looking at the same edifice.6 I recount a very brief history of judicial and
scholarly treatment of freedom of association and other Charterrights as
they relate to collective bargaining, leading particularly to the Supreme
Court's decision in Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector
BargainingAssn. v. British Columbia' and its aftermath. I am particularly
interested in thinking about how unions should operate strategically in the
Chartercathedral's shadow. Does and should the Chartercathedral have a
significant impact on union choices in using bargaining, political pressure,
or litigation strategies in pursuing their aims?
4.
Joel Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1997) at 3.
Michael Polyani & Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975) at 69.
5.
"It is commonly known that metaphors, like jokes, lose their effectiveness, if explained in detail." So
I will leave it to the reader to develop the metaphor more fully.
An alternate metaphor is that the Charter is a cathedral that is still being built, with all of these
6.
decisions and commentaries actually contribute to its construction. The written text of the Charter
is but an architectural blueprint, and the subsequent builders, while guided by the blueprint, have
many choices to make that affect how the edifice looks and functions. Think of the Sagrada Familia
Cathedral in Barcelona, Spain where construction started in 1882 and is not expected to be complete
until at least 2026 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sagrada-Familia). The Wikipedia commentary notes:
"Construction of the church is as much part of its attraction as the church itself."
7.
Health Services and Support - FacilitiesSubsector BargainingAssn v British Columbia, 2007
SCC 27, [2007] 2 SCR 391 [BC Health].
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I. The formative period
We can divide the artistic developments into three temporal phases, each
roughly covering a decade: the formative period, the consolidation period,
and the re-assessment period.
The legal story can be told rather quickly, and is essentially familiar to
most of you. In 1982 the CanadianCharterof Rights andFreedoms was
enacted as part of the CanadaAct, repatriating the Canadian constitution.
The Charterincluded a wide variety of protections for fundamental rights
and freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of association,
mobility rights and equality guarantees. What it did not contain was any
explicit reference to key labour rights such as the right to collectively
bargain or the right to strike. Trade unions were notably absent in the
debates leading to the passage of the Charter, therefore little pressure
was brought to bear for the inclusion of these rights.' Yet, the inclusion of
freedom of association, given its long association in international labour
and human rights conventions with rights to unionize and collectively
bargain, could easily have been understood as invoking those rights as
fundamental ones to be protected by the Charter.
Following the Charter's enactment, a series of uncoordinated
challenges by trade unions and disaffected workers sought to test and define
the limits of its protections in relation to a right to strike, to collectively
bargain, to engage in picketing in support of strikes, and to be free from
coerced association through union security clauses. In the formative
period, the most influential artistic treatment of the Charter'sapplication to
labour issues was produced by the Supreme Court's tryptich in the Labour
Trilogy in 1987,9 with its decision in the Alberta Reference forming the
main panel. The Court determined that freedom of association must be
understood as an individual right, and one that should be given a relatively
limited interpretation. It protects, the Court said, primarily the right to
form and maintain associations, but not the right to act in association, and
most certainly not the right to strike. Some of the brushstrokes used in
painting that picture included such phrases as:
[T]he modem rights to bargain collectively and to strike.. .are not
fundamental rights or freedoms. They are the creation of legislation,
involving a balance of competing interests in a field which has been
recognized by the courts as requiring a specialized expertise.'o
8.
See a discussion in Arthurs, "Labour and the "Real" Constitution" (2007) 48 C de D 43.
9.
Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta), [1987] 1 SCR 313, 38 DLR
(4th) 161 [Alberta Reference]; RWDSUvSaskatchewan, [1987] 1 SCR 460,38 DLR (4th) 277; PSAC
v Canada,[1987] I SCR 424, 38 DLR (4th) 249 [Labour Trilogy].
10. The Alberta Reference, ibidat391 per LeDain J.
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and
[G]olf is a lawful but not constitutionally protected activity. ... the
Legislature could prohibit golf entirely. However, the Legislature could
not constitutionally provide that golf could be played in pairs but in no
greater number, for this would infringe the Charter guarantee of freedom
of association.
and
[Labour law] is based upon a political and economic compromise
between organized labour-a very powerful socio-economic forceon the one hand, and the employers of labour-an equally powerful
socio-economic force-on the other.12
And, in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Dickson: "International
law provides a fertile source of insight into the nature and scope of the
freedom of association of workers.""
The formative power of that vision was demonstrated three years
later in the Supreme Court's decision in PIPS v. Northwest Territories
(Commissioner)1 4 when Chief Justice Dickson, who had dissented in the
Alberta Reference, nevertheless concluding that its view of the Charter
cathedral left no room for the alternative view that freedom of association
could protect collective bargaining rights.
In other decisions during this first decade affecting unions and
collective bargaining, the Supreme Court shielded common law rules
about picketing from Charter scrutiny," dismissed claims that the law
of contempt and its use in controlling the picketing of a courthouse by
strikers violated Charter guarantees,' 6 and found that the application of
common law criminal contempt penalties to an illegally striking union did
not violate the Charter."
A major work in the Court's formative oeuvre was completed by its
decision in Lavigne v. OntarioPublic Services Employees Union,'" which
addressed to some extent the fear of trade unions that the Chartercould
be used as a sword to undermine statutory and collective agreement
protections. The Court was divided on whether a freedom of non-

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Ibid at 408 per Mcintyre J.
Ibid at 414 per McIntyre J.
Ibid at 348 per Dickson CJ.
PIPS v Northwest Territories (Commissioner), [1990] 2 SCR 367, 72 DLR (4th) 1.
RWDSU, Local 580 v Dolphin Delivery Ltd, [ 1986] 2 SCR 573, 33 DLR (4th) 174.
BCGEUv British Columbia (Attorney General), [ 1988] 2 SCR 214, 53 DLR (4th) 1.
United Nurses ofAlberta v Alberta (Attorney General), [ 1992] 1 SCR 901, 89 DLR (4th) 609.
Lavigne v OntarioPublic Service Employees Union, [ 1991] 2 SCR 211, 81 DLR (4th) 545.
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association was embedded within the freedom of association guarantee,
but concluded that mandatory payment of Rand Formula union dues, and
union expenditures of those compulsory dues on non-collective bargaining
purposes, did not violate Charterguarantees. For those judges who viewed
union expenditures on non-collective bargaining purposes a violation of
freedom of non-association, they were nevertheless justified pursuant to
9
s. I of the Charter.1
At the same time that the Supreme Court was producing its formative
oeuvre on the Charter cathedral, academic commentators provided their
own sketches of the cathedral. From Arthurs' view that, in the context
of labour, "Charter litigation is not a game for serious people"2 0 to that
of Cavalluzo, who predicted that the Charterwould have a proportional
and incremental impact on trade unions, 21 the Charter cathedral was
seen through a variety of prisms. Very few saw it as transforming labour
relations, although some argued that it should. 22 A number of commentators
emphasized that the Court's view of the Chartercathedral was often tinted
by the judges' own basic assumptions and ideologies, which were firmly
embedded in a liberal framework of individualism, market ordering,
separation of economic and political spheres, and commitment to formal,
but not necessarily substantive equality.23 Others argued that the painting
produced by courts is not an accurate depiction of the Chartercathedral,
claiming that a more accurate rendering would lead to a finding that
freedom of association includes protection for collective bargaining and

19. There were a series of employment-related, but not collective bargaining related decisions
made during this period as well. See Slaight communications Inc v Davidson, [1989] 1 SCR 1038,
59 DLR (4th) 416; Osborne v Canada (Treasury Board), [1991] 2 SCR 69, 82 DLR (4th) 321;
Mckinney v University of Guelph, [1990] 3 SCR 229, 76 DLR (4th) 545; Stoffman v Vancouver
General Hospital, [1990] 3 SCR 483,76 DLR (4th) 700; and see cases dealing with benefits that had a
tangential employment connection, some of them decided during the Consolidation Period: Schachter
v Canada, [1992] 2 SCR 679, 93 DLR (4th) 1; Canada (Attorney General) v Mossop, [1993] 1 SCR
554, 100 DLR (4th) 658; Symes v Canada, [1993] 4 SCR 695, 110 DLR (4th) 470.
20. H WArthurs, "'The Right to Golf': Reflections on the Future of Workers, Unions and the Courts
from the Old to the New Dispensation" (Labour Law Under the Charter, delivered at the School of
Industrial Relations and Faculty of Law, Queen's University, 24-26 September 1987), (Kingston, Ont:
Queen's University, 1988) 17 at 18 [Labour Law Under the Charter].
21. Paul JJ Cavalluzzo, "Freedom of Association -Its Effect Upon Collective Bargaining and Trade
Unions" LabourLaw Under the Charter 267, supra note 19.
22. David Beatty, Putting the Charterto Work: Designinga ConstitutionalLabour Code (Kingston,
Ont: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987); and David Beatty & Steve Kennett, "Striking Back:
Fighting Words, Social Protest and Political Participation in Free and Democratic Societies" Labour
Law Under the Charter 214 at 215, supra note 19.
23. See, e.g. Judy Fudge, "Labour, The New Constitution and Old Style Liberalism" Labour Law
Under the Charter61, supranote 19; Michael MacNeil, "Courts and Liberal Ideology: An Analysis of
the Application of the Charter to Some Labour Law Issues" (1989) 34 McGill LJ 85.
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the right to strike. 24 Yet other commentators focused on the process of
painting, of interpreting, seeking to understand the techniques that lead
to the particular representation of the cathedral produced in a particular
judicial decisions. 25
Brian Etherington provided a comprehensive overview of the painters
in a 1992 article, 26 sorting the academic commentators into three classes:
liberal romantics, realist skeptics and pragmatic pluralists. The liberal
romantics, perhaps best exemplified by David Beatty, believed that
Charterjudicialreview of labour statutes could lead to the righting of many
injustices within our system of collective bargaining, such as the exclusion
of marginalized workers from the protections of collective bargaining
regimes. Realist skeptics, on the other hand, held little expectation that
courts would use the Charter to effect any fundamental changes in our
labour relations system. Pragmatic pluralists, perhaps best exemplified
by Paul Weiler, 27 fell somewhere between the liberal romantics and the
realist skeptics, arguing in favour of the legitimacy of judicial review
under the Charter,but expressing concern about the competence of the
courts to involve themselves in complex labour relations policy issues,
yet ultimately demonstrating faith that the courts would figure out when
it was appropriate to intervene and when it was best to stay out of policy
making. Etherington's own review of ten years of Supreme Court Charter
decisions on labour issues led him to conclude that the liberal romantic
perspective had been completely rejected. While he acknowledged
Weiler's argument that the cases demonstrated a pragmatic pluralist
perspective towards judicial restraint, Etherington concludes that the
realist arguments about the contingency of judicial review and pragmatic
deference are not contradicted by the actual decisions. He tended towards
the view that traditional judicial values and a post-Charterlegal culture of
individualism would lead to increasing judicial intervention in the labour
scheme.

24. Geoffrey England, "Some Thoughts on Constitutionalising the Right to Strike" Labour Law
Under the Charter 168, supra note 19.
25. Brian Langille, "Revolution Without Foundation: The Grammar of Scepticism and Law" Labour
Law Under the Charter 112, supra note 19, warning against the corrosive effects of skepticism in
assessing the legitimacy ofjudicial interpretation.
26. Brian Etherington, "An Assessment of Judicial Review of Labour Laws Under the Charter: Of
Realists, Romantics, and Pragmatists" (1992) 24 Ottawa L Rev 685.
27. Paul C Weiler, "The Charter at Work: Reflections on the Constitutionalizing of Labour and
Employment Law" (1990) 40 UTLJ 117.
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II. The consolidationperiod
In the second decade of Charterjurisprudence, the consolidation period,
the Supreme Court painted more pictures of the cathedral as it related to
freedom of association, freedom of non-association and picketing rights
of unions. It also made important decisions about the role of arbitrators in
considering Charterclaims. With respect to freedom of non-association,
the Court struggled in R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring" to build on the
vision in Lavigne: by a substantial majority the Court solidified the view
that Charter protection for freedom of association also included protection
for freedom of non-association. By a five to four majority it also concluded
that a Quebec statutory scheme making employment in the construction
industry conditional on union membership did not violate the Charter,
either because it did not impose compulsory ideological conformity, or in
the swing vote of Justice laccobucci, because the violation of freedom of
non-association was justified under s. I of the Charter.
In 1995, the Supreme Court made a key decision in Weber v. Ontario
Hydro,2 9 holding that arbitrators under collective agreements not only had
the jurisdiction to deal with Charterclaims when raised in the context of
applying collective agreements to workplace disputes,30 but that they also
had the jurisdiction to provide Charter-relatedremedies such as damages
and declarations. Moreover, the jurisdiction of arbitrators to consider the
Charterclaims was deemed to be exclusive where "the conduct giving rise
to the dispute between the parties arises either expressly or inferentially out
of the collective agreement between them."" One possible consequence
of this decision, noted by several commentators, is that it could render
arbitrators virtually incapable of performing their core function of
resolving collective bargaining disputes on the basis of the terms of the
collective agreement with a primary goal of promoting the health of the
parties' relationship.32
The consolidation period also saw a reconsideration of the extent of
Charterprotection for picketing as a form of free expression. In U.EC. W,

28. R vAdvance Cutting & CoringLtd, 2001 SCC 70, [2001] 3 SCR 209.
29. Weber v OntarioHydro [1995] 2 SCR 929, 125 DLR (4th) 583.
30. The Court had earlier affirmed this point in Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Assn v Douglas College,
[199013 S.C.R. 570, noting the specialized competence of arbitrators maybe of assistance to reviewing
courts in assessing the workplace context in which the Charterclaim is being made.
31. Weber, supranote 29 at para 68.
32. Claire Mumm6, "Labour Arbitration as Translation: The Transformation of Canadian Labour
Arbitration in the Twentieth Century from a Semi-Autonomous Institution of the Shop to an
Institution of the State" (January 1, 2008). Available at SSRN: <http://ssm.com/abstract-1485682>;
H Arthurs, "The New Economy and the New Legality: Industrial Citizenship and the Future of Labour
Arbitration," (2000) 7 Can Lab & Empl L J 45.
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Local 1518 v Kmart CanadaLtd.," the Court turned away from its view
in the formative period, expressed in Dolphin Delivery, that common-law
regulation of picketing was beyond the Charter cathedral's shadow, and
confined the BC courthouse picketing case to its relatively unusual setting.
The Court not only acknowledged in Kmart that picketing had substantial
expressive elements that were Charter protected, but concluded that
British Columbia Labour Code limitations on consumer leafleting were
not justified under s. 1. Perhaps more significantly, near the end of the
consolidation period, the Court repainted the Chartercathedral's shadow,
deciding that common law rules regulating picketing should be interpreted
in accordance with Chartervalues, thus leading it to reject the view that
secondary picketing was per se illegal.34 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
also summarily dismissed arguments that the Charter, through its s. 7
guarantee of liberty and the right not to be deprived thereof except in
accordance with principles of fundamental justice, provided any protection
for a right to strike."
In assessing the positive guarantee of freedom of association, the
Supreme Court continued to reproduce its earlier view that collective
bargaining and a right to strike were unprotected, but the consolidation
period did see some new brushstrokes that set the stage to a fundamental
reconsideration of the issue during the Charter'sthird decade. In two cases
during the consolidation period, the Supreme Court dealt with the lack of
access to collective bargaining by different groups of workers. In Delisle,3 6
the Supreme Court rejected the claim of RCMP officers that their exclusion
from a statutory collective bargaining regime violated their Charterrights.
The Court's rendering of the Charter cathedral was very similar to its
earlier paintings in the Labour Trilogy and PIPS, finding no protection
for collective bargaining, and significantly, denying equality-based claims
that denial of access to a statutory collective bargaining regime violated s.
15 of the Charter.
A slightly different view of the Charter cathedral was presented
in Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General)," dealing with exclusion of
agricultural workers from statutory collective bargaining protection. The
33. UFCW Local 1518 v KMart CanadaLtd, [1999] 2 SCR 1083, 176 DLR (4th) 607 [Kmart]. See
also the companion case of Allsco Building Products Ltd v UFCW Local 1288P, [1999] 2 SCR 1136,
176 DLR (4th) 647.
34. RWDSU, Local 558 v Pepsi-ColaCanadaBeverages (West) Ltd, 2002 SCC 8, [2002] 1 SCR 156
[Pepsi].
35. ILWU, Local 500 v Canada, [1994] 1 SCR 150, noting that the arguments about the nonapplicability of s 2(d) to a right to strike also applies to s 7.
36. Delisle v Canada(Deputy Attorney General), [1999] 2 SCR 989, 176 DLR (4th) 513.
37. Dunmore v Ontario (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 94, [2001] 3 SCR 1016.
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Supreme Court did not abandon its position that freedom of association
does not protect collective bargaining, and it continued to insist that s. 15
did not apply to a claim of discrimination against an occupational group.
Nevertheless, the Court did provide a somewhat different perspective in
painting the picture, acknowledging that freedom of association could
provide protection for some collective activity beyond the forming
and maintaining of associations. In particular, it indicated that such
group activities as "making collective representations to an employer,
adopting a majority political platform, federating with other unions" were
protected associational activities.38 It further found that if the failure of the
government to include a marginalized group within the protections of a
statutory collective bargaining scheme prevented the workers from being
able to exercise their freedom of association, the government could be
ordered to remedy the lack of protection.
This entailed an expanded view of state action and an evidentiary base
linking the absence of state protection to the inability to act in association.
The Court's choice of palette here drew on articulations of freedom of
association in international labour and human rights instruments, as had
Chief Justice Dickson in his dissenting opinion in the Alberta Reference.
Dunmore' aftermath is well known, with the Ontario legislature
maintaining the exclusion of agricultural workers from statutory collective
bargaining regimes while enacting a parsimonious statutory scheme that
only provided some protection against employer interference in employee
groups and a right to make collective representations to employers,
without any corresponding employer obligation to negotiate with the
union representing the agricultural workers.39 That scheme was upheld
by the Supreme Court in Fraser v. Ontario (A.G.) 0 which provides an
important new contribution to its Chartercathedral oeuvre.
The Supreme Court's oeuvre during the consolidation period sparked
another series of Chartercathedral sketches by academic and professional
commentators. These provided a variety of viewpoints. Diane Pothier's
assessment of 20 years of Charterjurisprudence concluded that, as of
2002, the Charter had at best a moderate influence on labour law, and
that successful challenges produced results that were within the dominant

38. Ibid at para 17.
39. Agricultural Employees ProtectionAct, 2002, SO 2002, c 16. The employees' right to make
representations through their representative imposed on employers a duty to "listen to the representations
if made orally, or read them if made in writing" and to "give a written acknowledgement that [it] has
read them." (ss 5(6) and (7)). Nothing more, certainly no requirement to bargain in good faith.
40. Fraserv Ontario (AG), 2011 SCC 20 rev'g 2008 ONCA 760 [Fraser].The decision is discussed
in more detail below.
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legislative model in Canada, being neither revolutionary nor counterrevolutionary.4 1 She did, however, acknowledge that the most recent
developments, such as Pepsi and Dunmore, held the potential for a more
significant judicial intervention into labour relations, although at that point
it was too early to tell whether this would in fact arise.
A number of commentators focused particularly on Dunmore; for
example, I argued that the Supreme Court in Dunmore and Advance
Cuttingshowed an increased willingness of the courts to assess the balance
struck by legislators, with particular concern for the democratic and
representative role of unions in economic, political and social spheres.4 2
In her comment on Dunmore, Patricia Hughes notes that one lesson to
be drawn, for those seeking to use the Charterto challenge exclusion of
groups of workers from the protections of collective bargaining regimes,
is the importance of perseverance.43 She characterizes this case as one of
a series in which the Court has abandoned its self-proclaimed restraint
with respect to Charterreview of labour relations issues. She also notes
that the assessment of groups under s. 2(d) begins to take on the character
of assessment under the equality rights guarantee in s. 15 of the Charter.
This insight is particularly prescient in light of later critiques of BC
Health which argue that an equality analysis would have provided a better
foundation for addressing issues of differential treatment of health care
workers and cases of under-inclusion. Hughes also raised the question of
the extent of the legislature's obligation to take positive action, in light of
Dunmore. This is a theme which, of course, the Court has been forced to
reconsider in light of the appeal in Fraser.
Other commentators also saw the potential of Dunmore, with Roy
Adams claiming that it had "the potential to radically change the norms,
attitudes and practices that" inform the enduring practices of Canadian
industrial relations." In particular, he saw in the Dunmore reasoning the
potential for developing rights outside the Wagner Act45 model that has
41. Dianne Pothier, "Twenty Years of Labour Law and the Charter"(2002) 40 Osgoode Hall U 369.
42. Michael MacNeil, "Unions and the Charter: The Supreme Court of Canada and Democratic
Values" (2002) 10 CLELJ 1.
43. Patricia Hughes, "Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General): Waiting for the Other Shoe" (2002)
10 CLELJ 27. She notes that the trial decision and the decision of the Ontario Court ofAppeal denying
the claim of the agricultural workers appeared to apply the obvious conclusions arising from the right
to strike trilogy and other cases; perseverance with an appeal to the Supreme Court paid off, both in
forcing the legislature to act to provide a protective scheme, and in laying the foundation for a more
complete reassessment of the meaning of freedom of association and its application to collective
bargaining in BC Health, supra note 6.
44. Roy Adams, "The Revolutionary Potential of Dunmore" (2002) 10 CLELJ 117.
45. National Labor Relations Act, Pub L No 74-198, 49 Stat 452 (codified as amended at 29 USC
§ 151-169 (1935)) [WagnerAct].
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shaped the Canadian labour relations architecture. Specifically, he saw
the decision as opening the way for non-majority unions and a right to
strike for groups that have not been licensed to do so through traditional
certification processes. Steven Barrett, who represented the Canadian
Labour Congress as an intervenor in Dunmore, argues that the decision
opened the door for a more expansive reading of freedom of association,
leading to recognition of protection for collective bargaining and the right
to strike.4 6 One cannot help but note his 'happy' willingness to leave it to
further Charter challenges to determine whether his own broader reading
of Dunmore, or a narrower perspective, would prevail. John Craig and
Henry Dinsdale, two commentators who normally represent employer
positions in litigation, commented on the lack of principled basis in
Dunmore for extending protection for some union activities but not for
collective bargaining and striking.47 They characterized the decision as an
attempt to gloss over the divisions with the Court about the nature and
scope of freedom of association and role of judicial deference in labour
relations. The Court would inevitably have to confront the question of
what Dunmore really meant.
III. The re-assessmentperiod
Confront it is exactly what the Supreme Court did in BC Health,4 8 the
leading decision so far in the Charter's third decade, the re-assessment
Period, sweeping away its established precedents, and holding that
freedom of association does indeed include protection for a process of
collective bargaining. But before discussing BC Health, it is worth noting
another Supreme Court decision preceding it, one that might be regarded
as initiating the re-assessment period.
Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. NAPE, 4 9 like BC Health that
was to follow, dealt with legislative intervention to override collective
agreement terms. Here, the Province of Newfoundland, as employer, had
entered into pay equity agreements with unions, making those agreements
part of their collective agreements. In 1991, as the parties completed the
process of identifying specific payments that would have to be made to
eliminate and compensate for pay differentials between male and female
employees, the government claimed to be facing an unprecedented
fiscal crisis, and enacted a wage freeze on public sector employees and

46. Steven M Barrett, "Dunmore v Ontario (Attorney General): Freedom of Association at the
Crossroads" (2002) 10 CLELJ 84.
47. John Craig & Henry Dinsdale, "A"New Trilogy" or the Same Old Story?" (2002) 10 CLELJ 59.
48. BC Health, supra note 6.
49. Newfoundland (Treasury Board) vNAPE, 2004 SCC 66, [2004] 3 SCR 381 [NAPE].
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delayed the implementation of pay equity adjustments. The effect of the
delay was to reduce the amount that the government would have to pay
in total by $24 million. In the decision released in 2004, the Supreme
Court reviewed the statutorily imposed pay equity freeze under s. 15 of
the Charter, concluding that the legislation had a discriminatory impact
on female employees. The Court treated the inclusion of the pay equity
scheme within the collective agreement as having legal significance. It
was a contractually recognized 'entitlement' that was targeted by the
legislation, and that characterization led the Court to reject the Province's
argument that the pay equity entitlements were merely a privilege that
the government could give and take away. In the end, however, the Court
concluded that the delay in making the pay equity adjustments, with the
major losses it entailed for the workers, was justified under s. 1 of the
Charter by the government's need to address the very major financial
crisis it was facing.
Two observations arise from the differing approaches in NAPE
and BC Health. In the latter, the Court would reject the s. 15 challenge
rather summarily, stating that "the distinctions made by the Act relate
essentially to segregating different sectors of employment, in accordance
with the long-standing practice in labour regulation of creating legislation
specific to particular segments of the labour force, and do not amount to
discrimination." 0 Hence, distinctions are said to be based on occupational
segregation, and there is no requirement to take into account discriminatory
effect. This rejection of an equality basis for holding the government to
account nevertheless can be seen, on the one hand, as opening the doors
for the more robust freedom of association analysis that the Court was
willing to adopt, but on the other, opening the door for courts to much
more aggressively involve themselves in designing collective bargaining
regimes for those who have been traditionally excluded from accessing
existing regimes. The second observation arises from the justification that
the NAPE Court recognized in upholding the validity of the discriminatory
legislation. Although it concluded that the crisis situation did justify the
restraint legislation, it noted that it would "look with strong scepticism at
attempts to justify infringements of Charterrights on the basis of budgetary
constraints."" The Court quoted this passage in BC Health, expressing
doubt that cost cutting goals and an attempt to increase managerial

50. BC Health, supranote 48, at para 165.
51. NAPE, supra note 49 at para 72. See Patricia Hughes, "Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v
NAPE: Women as Sacrificial Lambs" (2005) 11 CLELJ 383 for her trenchant criticism of the Court's
application of s 1.
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power could be pressing and substantial objectives that would justify the
interference with freedom of association. However, the improvement of
health care delivery was such a pressing and substantial objective, but
one which the legislature overshot the mark by failing to consult and
impairing collective bargaining rights more than necessary to achieve the
objective. So while the Supreme Court's equality analysis in BC Health
may be disheartening in comparison to NAPE, its more vigorous oversight
of government justifications may be a significant advance for those
challenging legislative limits on collective bargaining.
BC Health marks an astounding about-face in the Court's freedom of
association jurisprudence. Going beyond the very limited right to make
representations that had been acknowledged inDunmoreas an associational
right, the Supreme Court re-examined the logic of its previous holdings,
the history of the right to collective bargaining in Canada, the development
of freedom of association as an international human rights norm, and the
role of Charter values, convincing itself that the freedom of association
portion of the Chartercathedral had been grievously misrepresented in
earlier depictions. As a result, the Court declared invalid several sections
of a British Columbia statute52 enacted to facilitate reorganization and cost
savings within the health care sector in the Province.
There are five key points in the Court's decision." First, freedom of
association includes protection for the right of individuals to engage in
associational activities, including protection for the process of collective
bargaining. Second, the right is to a general process of collective bargaining,
not to any particular statutory model. Third, freedom of association
protects only against substantial interference with associational activity.
This requires a two-part inquiry: what is the importance of the matter
affected to collective bargaining; and how does the measure impact on
the collective right to good faith negotiation and consultation. Fourth,
the inquiry in every case is contextual and fact-specific, and situations of
exigency and urgency may affect the content of the modalities of the duty
to bargain in good faith. Such issues may become particularly important
in determining if a violation of freedom of association is justified under s.
I of the Charter.Fifth, and finally, the Court specifically mentions several
examples of government action that may violate the guarantee of freedom
of association, including acts of bad faith, unilateral modification of
negotiated terms without meaningful negotiation or consultation, and the

52. Health and Social Services Delivery Improvement Act, SBC 2002, c 2.
53. 1draw on an earlier talk I presented to the Canadian Industrial Relations Association, on 6 June
2008 in Vancouver, BC).
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Dunmore situation where denial of union access to a collective bargaining
regime denies members of a vulnerable group the opportunity to exercise
meaningful associative freedoms.
In the decision itself, the Court found that some of the statutory
provisions interfering with collective bargaining were substantial, and
therefore an infringement of freedom of association, while others were not
sufficiently substantial to warrant Court oversight. In particular, provisions
which nullified collective agreement terms and prohibited bargaining on
contracting out, layoffs and bumping, were struck down, while provisions
limiting schemes for transferring and reassignment of employees were
not considered to be substantial interference. In assessing whether the
legislative intervention was justified under s. I of the Charter,the Court
found that the government did not provide convincing evidence of minimal
impairment of the freedom of association. It noted the lack of consultation
with unions before the passage of the legislation, and used this as a basis
for its conclusion that the government had failed to demonstrate that there
were no reasonable alternatives to this particular scheme that may have
been less intrusive on the right to collective bargaining.
This decision has a number of important consequences. First, it
had consequences for the particular employees and unions affected by
the legislation that was under review. Ultimately, the British Columbia
government enacted legislation rescinding the offending legislative
sections, and paid $84 million in compensation to the workers and unions
affected by the unconstitutional provisions.54 However, it must be noted
that the consequences were in some ways quite limited, as the restructuring
remained in place with significant detrimental consequences for unions
and employees.
Second, BC Health has consequence for unions, employees, employers
and government in assessing how it might be applied to other claims about
intrusion on collective bargaining rights. An assessment of consequences
requires evaluation along a number of dimensions. The remainder of this
paper will assess the consequences of BC Health from the perspectives
of unions' strategic choices in pursuing Charter litigation as a means of
pursuing their social, political and economic agendas. To do this, I present
a review of some of the debates about the dangers of Charterlitigation in
general, and a review of some of the literature assessing the significance
of the potential changes arising from BC Health, asking whether they are
merely reinforcing an already problematic regulatory regime, or whether
they have the potential to create more revolutionary change? To more
54.

See John P McEvoy, "BC Health Services: The Legacy after 18 Months" (2009) 59 UNBLJ 48.
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fully assess the potential of a litigation strategy, I will finish by presenting
an overview of post-BC Health cases that challenge current regulatory
restrictions on collective bargaining, discussing some challenges are likely
to be made, and including a look at some situations where governments are
reacting or treading carefully even in the absence of a Charterchallenge.
IV. Trade union strategies:Avoiding or embracing the siren call of
juridificationand human rights
Some Canadian trade union leaders as well as some labour and
constitutional scholars are wary of the constitutionalization of labour
relations and the path on which it might lead trade unions in pursuing
the fruits of a robust approach to freedom of association. Roy Adams has
noted the lack of enthusiasm displayed by union leaders at the Canadian
Labour Congress Convention following the BC Health decision." Buzz
Hargrove, former president of the Canadian Auto Workers, echoed that
mood when he emphasized the need for unions to engage in community
and political action in the search for social change." Only such action,
he says, will provide the foundation on which significant progress will
be made. Courts, in his view, are more likely to reflect that social change
through their Charterinterpretations, rather than building the foundation
for change. Larry Savage, a political scientist focusing on labour issues
takes much the same position. He argues that "the power of labour does not
flow from rights. Rather, rights flow from labour's political power."" He
fears that union pursuit of collective bargaining as a human right will tend
to de-politicize class-based approaches, replacing them with elite driven
judicial strategies which foster a sense of individualism at the expense of
a belief in the transformative potential of collective worker power, doing
little to challenge inequalities in wealth."
Yet there is little doubt that the BC Health decision can be seen, as
Judy Fudge has put it, as a symbolic and moral victory that brings trade

55. Roy J Adams, "Prospects for Labour's Right to Bargain Collectively After BC Health Services,"
(2009) 59 UNBLJ 85.
56. Buzz Hargrove, "Striking a Collective Bargain: The Supreme Court Decision in BC Health
Services" (2009) 59 UNBLJ 41.
57. Larry Savage, "Workers' Rights as Human Rights: Organized Labour and Rights Discourse in
Canada" (2009) 34 Labor Studies J 8.
58. See Roy Adams & Larry Savage: Roy J Adams, "From Statutory Right to Human Right: The
Evolution and Current Status of Collective Bargaining" (2008) 12 Just Labour 48; Larry Savage,
"Labour Rights as Human Rights? A Response to Roy Adams" (2008) 12 Just Labour 68; and Roy J
Adams, "I-Mode, the New Language of Workers' Rights: A Rejoinder to Larry Savage" (2008) 12 Just
Labour 76.
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union rights into balance with many other Charter rights. 9 We need,
nevertheless, to ask what the value of such a symbolic and moral victory
is likely to be. Does it carry with it any significant costs, and are there
useful ways for deploying symbols and moral victories? Some paint a
relatively rosy picture of the BC Health decision and its likely aftermath.
Roy Adams, who had earlier written about the revolutionary potential of
Dunmore, saw as a key factor pointing the way ahead the Supreme Court's
statement in BC Health that the Charter"should be presumed to provide at
least as great a level of protection as is found in international human rights
documents that Canada has ratified." 6 0 Adams concludes from his own
review of international protections that BC Health demands protection
for minority unions,. ones that cannot demonstrate that they have the
support of a majority of workers in some defined unit, granting them a
constitutionally protected right to engage in collective bargaining on behalf
of their members. He is thus highly critical of that aspect of the Ontario
Court of Appeal's decision in Fraser,discussed below, holding that one
of the collective bargaining rights protected by freedom of association is
a system of exclusive representation by a union demonstrating that it has
majority support. 6 1
David Doorey's assessment of the application of BC Health to limits
on union access to workers during organization campaigns sees conflicting
elements in the BC Health logic. He argues that a commitment to
following ILO freedom of association principles would lead to a
fundamental reconsideration of the constitutionality of restrictions arising
from employer property and managerial prerogative claims. But he sees the
evidentiary burden of demonstrating substantial impairment of collective
bargaining rights makes it unlikely that unions will be able to effectively
challenge the statutory and jurisprudential status quo.
Adelle Blackett provides a cautiously optimistic rendering of the
Charter cathedral, celebrating the Court's simultaneous drawing on the
Wagner model to elucidate the content of collective bargaining rights
while maintaining that freedom of association does not entail a right to
any particular statutory regime. She notes that BC Health "has crafted
both the space to valourize the industrial pluralism model that make the

59. Judy Fudge, "The Supreme Court of Canada and the Right to Bargain Collectively: The
Implications of the Health Services and Support case in Canada and Beyond" (2008) 37 Indus LJ 25.
60. Roy Adams, "Prospects for Labour's Right to Bargain Collectively after BC Health" supra note
55, citing BC Health, supra note 48 at para 70.
61. Adams, ibidat 89.
62. David J Doorey, "Union Access to Workers during Organizing Campaigns: A New Look through
the Lens of BC HealthServices" (2010) 15 CLELJ 1.
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freedom of association meaningful for paradigmatic Fordist workers, but
has also expressly acknowledged that labour relations paradigm shift
and that collective bargaining models might overlap and coexist as large
sectors of the labour market face economic restructuring."6 3 Blackett
alsb warns about the need to pay attention to the relationship between
collective bargaining and equality, decrying the Court's refusal to apply
s. 15 of the Charter to discrimination as between groups in collective
bargaining regulation. She points to the decision of the Quebec court in
4
CSN v. Qudbec (Procureurgndral)6
in which the Court struck down,
on both s. 2(d) and s. 15 grounds, Quebec legislation barring access of
mostly female homecare workers from the general statutory collective
bargaining scheme without adequate alternative guarantees that would
enable representative organizations to bargain on behalf of these workers.
She sees this as a hopeful a sign that courts might integrate freedom of
association and equality analysis.
One particular problem arising from the Supreme Court's insistence
in both Dunmore and BC Health that the freedom of association guarantee
does not create a right to any particular legislative scheme is figuring out a
way of overcoming the public-private issue; it is the refusal of employers
to engage in collective bargaining unless statutorily required to do so
that acts as a barrier to union representation by private sector workers.
Quebec commentators have noted, however, that there is a way around
that problem in their province, by importing the freedom of association
analysis into the application of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and

Freedoms. 65
Several commentators question whether the Supreme Court's
reasoning in BC Health can withstand close scrutiny. In particular,
Langille and Tucker criticize the BC Health Court's revised view of
collective bargaining history, which in the right to strike trilogy had been
characterized as a modem statutory right, as imbricating a particular
approach to collective bargaining (the modified Canadian Wagner Act
model) within the. interpretation of freedom of association.66 As well,
Langille subjects the Court's use of international human rights norms to
close review, expressing concern that the Court did not adequately address
63. Adelle Blackett, "Mutual Promise: International Labour Law and BC HealthServices" (2009) 48
SCLR (2d) 365, at 395.
64. CSNv Qudbec (Procureurgeneral),2008 QCCS 5076, [2009] JQ no 13317.
65. Christian Brunelle, Michel Coutu & Gilles Trudeau, "La constitutionalisation du droit du travail:
un nouveau paradigm" (2007) 50 C de D 5.
66. Brian Langille, "The Freedom of Association Mess: How We Got into it and How We Can Get
out of It" (2009) 54 McGill L J 177; Eric Tucker, "The Constitutional Right to Bargain Collectively:
The Ironies of Labour History in the Supreme Court of Canada" (2008) 61 Labour/Le Travail 151.
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the problems of using International Labour Organization conventions
to which Canada is a not a party and relying on the ILO's Freedom of
Association Committee as a definitive source for legal interpretation of
what freedom of association means within the Canadian constitution. 67
Some of the most trenchant criticism comes from those who fear
the same thing that the pragmatic pluralists have always been concerned
about: an insufficiently expert and accountable court engaging in the
exercise of writing a constitutional labour code. One fear is that the code
contain a pastiche of statutory collective bargaining protections (duty
to bargain in good faith, specific unfair labour practices, union security
clauses, exclusivity and majoritarianism, arbitration as a required dispute
resolution process) that may entrench some of the problematic aspects
of the Wagner model that informed the development of Canadian labour
relations statutes. Fudge describes the BC Health decision as an instance
of the Court embracing "Fordist labour rights in a post-Fordist economy" 68
and further comments that constitutionalizing collective bargaining rights
will not solve the problems of unions' economic and political weakness.
Bartkiw is another who urges caution, if not skepticism, about the true
impact of labour victories in recent Chartercases. His concern, like that
of others, is that a decision like Frasermay "reinforce the legitimacy of
what is increasingly understood as a restrictive model for effectuating
the concept of "freedom of association," let alone for ameliorating
socioeconomic inequality in concrete terms." 69 Langille, who generally
applauds the outcomes in both BC Health and Fraser, argues that the
results could have been achieved without equating freedom of association
with its instantiation in the extant Canadian statutory collective bargaining
regimes. The way to this result in Langille's view is to treat those cases
as a violation of the Charter's equality guarantee, 0 as also advocated by
Blackett." Achieving this would require the Court to fundamentally alter
course in its approach to s. 15 interpretation, and in particular its insistence
that the provision prohibits only those forms of discrimination based on
the listed grounds or ones analogous thereto. It might be argued that it
is no more unrealistic to expect the Court to do such a significant about
67. Brian Langille, "Why Are Canadian Judges Drafting Labour Codes - And Constitutionalizing
the Wagner Act Model?" (2010) 15 CLELJ 101; B Langille, "Can We Rely on the ILO?" (2007) 13
CLELJ 273.
68. Judy Fudge, "Brave New Words: Labour, the Courts and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms" (2010) 28 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 23.
69. See, eg Timothy J Bartkiw, "Proceed With Caution, or Stop Wherever Possible? Ongoing
Paradoxes in Legalized Labour Politics" (2010) 15 CLELJ 77 at 100.
70. Langille, supra note 66.
71. Supra note 63.
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face than it was to expect it to fundamentally re-consider its position on
freedom of association.
There remain the skeptics, too, who acknowledge with some surprise
that the Court's move to provide access to collective bargaining to
vulnerable groups may be a good thing, but whose fundamental reaction is
"so what". Harry Arthurs, for example, takes the position that the Charter
generally, and its impact on workers is no exception to that position,
makes little or no difference to economic, social or political life.72 Despite
the relative ineffectiveness of the Charter,Arthurs nevertheless remains
concerned that using "the Charteras a template for the design of industrial
relations systems ... [increases] the risk that in the long term the approach
of the courts will prevail over that of experts. This in turn enhances the
likelihood that legislatures will arrive at dysfunctional or at least suboptimal solutions." 73
For unions, the issue becomes the extent to which litigation strategies
are a sensible way of using union resources to promote the welfare of
their members and of workers generally, as opposed to working within
existing schemes or focusing on political action to resist encroachment on
existing rights or to seek more fundamental change. One aspect of making
that evaluation is determining the limits and potential of BC Health with
respect to both issues that unions would seek to advance, and issues where
the decision could be used as a sword against unions. That assessment
needs to take into account the many situations in which Charter rights are
or might be invoked.
V. Currentand potentialchallenges
A plethora of cases have already started testing the application ofBCHealth
to a range of issues, including limits on access to collective bargaining for
particular groups, limits on bargaining processes, regulation of strikes, and
the (re)structuring of collective bargaining regimes. The overview below
examines some of the more important cases.
1. Under-inclusiveregimes and access to collective bargaining
protections
A number of cases have challenged statutory exclusions that deny access
to collective bargaining regulatory frameworks for specific classes of
72. Harry Arthurs, "Constitutionalizing the Right of Workers to Organize, Bargain and Strike: The
Sight of One Shoulder Shrugging" (2010) 15 CLELJ 373 [One Shoulder Shrugging]; H Arthurs &
B Arnold, "Does the Charter Matter?" (2005) 11 Rev Const Stud 37; H Arthurs, "Labour and the
'Real' Constitution" (2007) 48 C de D 43; H Arthurs, "Constitutionalism -An Idea Whose Time Has
Gone?" (2008) 75:3 Amicus Curiae 3.
Come .and
73. One Shoulder Shrugging, ibidat 382.
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workers. To date, these challenges have been somewhat successful,
with courts in some cases revisiting and reversing earlier decisions. For
instance, the Quebec Superior Court has held that the denial of access
to collective bargaining for home care workers violates s. 2(d), 74 as has
the New Brunswick court in relation to denial of access to public sector
collective bargaining regime for casual and temporary workers." The case
of exclusion of RCMP officers from collective bargaining, which had
6
been upheld in Delisle, has now been reversed in light of BC Health.1
In
Ontario, the legislature responded to political pressure, undoubtedly with
the spectre of litigation in the background, anid extended access to collective
bargaining for part-time college staff. In a report preceding the legislative
initiative, Kevin Whittaker noted that all parties consulted supported the
extension of collective bargaining rights to part time college employees,
and so the focus of his report was on whether part time employees should
be in separate bargaining units or whether they should be rolled into larger
existing units along with full-time employees. 7 He recommended, and the
legislature adopted the separate bargaining unit model."
There are several points to be made about these cases. In BC Health
the Court had identified under-inclusive legislation as a possible violation
of the newly articulated freedom of association protection for collective
bargaining, but had noted as well that such protection might only be
extended where "the freedom would be next to impossible (emphasis
added) to exercise without positively recognizing a right to access a
statutory regime."79 The 'next to impossible' standard appears to set a very
74. CSN, supra note 62.
75. CUPE v New Brunswick, 2009 NBQB 164, 350 NBR (2d) 73. In Nova Scotia, this issue was
settled at a political level, without resort to litigation. The government agreed to the inclusion of
casual workers in the bargaining unit of permanent employees: Civil Service Collective Bargaining
Act, RSNS 1989, c 71, s 11(1) as amended by SNS 2007, c 33, expanding the definition ofemployee
to include students and persons hired on a casual or seasonal basis for a period of more than ten weeks
in a twelve month period.
76. Mounted Police Association of Ontario v Canada (Attorney General) (2009), 96 OR (3d) 20,
[2009] CLLC para 220-027 (SC) [MPAO]. The federal government has appealed the decision, but has
also introduced Bill C-43 in Parliament in June of 2010 to enact the Royal CanadianMounted Police
Labour Relations Modernization Act. The Bill would create a tailored collective bargaining regime
for the RCMP. However, in October 2010, just days before the existing regime would have become
invalid under the remedy provided in MPAO, the government obtained a stay from the Ontario Court
of Appeal, effective until thirty days after the Supreme Court hands down its decision in Fraser
Mounted PoliceAssociation of Ontariov Canada (Attorney General), 2010 ONCA 635. The granting
of the stay was made subject to four conditions that would enable the associations seeking to represent
the RCMP officers to have access to them through emails, meetings on the employer's premises and
posting on bulletin boards.
77. Kevin Whittaker, A Review ofthe Colleges Collective BargainingAct (2008).
78. Colleges Collective BargainingAct, 2008 SO 2008, c 15.
79. Supra note 7 at para 34.
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high bar to those complaining about lack of access. The Supreme Court had
already indicated in Dunmore that RCMP officers like those pursuing their
case in MPAO were not in a particularly vulnerable position. The MPAO
decision eludes these barriers by finding that the root of the claim is not in
the exclusion of officers from the public sector bargaining regime, but in
the regulatory imposition of a non-collective bargaining labour relations
regime which effectively thwarts the ability of officers to choose their own
representatives. Other cases ignore the 'next to impossible' standard and
instead concentrate on whether the lack of access substantially contributes
to a violation of protected freedoms. 0
The case of Quebec home workers is based not only in a freedom of
association analysis, but also in a s. 15 Charterclaim. That it was able to do
so says more about the ghettoization of women in particular kinds of jobs
than about the potential of equality analysis generally for addressing the
claims of groups denied access to collective bargaining. And even when
a union obtains access, it does not necessarily mean that it will be easy
for it to exercise their new rights. Two years after the passage of enabling
legislation, and fourteen months after an application for certification
was filed, part-time college workers in Ontario still have not had a union
certified to represent them because of a variety of challenges posed by the
colleges.'
Perhaps the most significant under-inclusion case is Fraserv. Ontario
82
which revisits the aftermath of the Dunmore
(Attorney-General)
decision. In Dunmore, the Supreme Court had determined that the lack of
positive protection for agricultural workers and their unions constituted a
violation of freedom of association, but did not hold that they were entitled
to access the protections of a collective bargaining regime. The response
of the Ontario legislature, enacting the AgriculturalEmployees Protection
Act," was to provide minimal levels of protection to workers against
employer interference in the formation and maintenance of union, and to
create a right to make representations to employers. But it did not provide
for collective bargaining as many would have understood the term, and
not surprisingly agricultural workers and the union seeking to represent
them again challenged this response. The trial decision, delivered before
80. See e.g., CUPE v New Brunswick, supra note 75.
81. The Ontario Public Service Employees' Union filed an application to represent part-time staff
in July 2009. In a decision released 27 September 2010, over 14 months later, the Ontario Labour
Relations Board was still dealing with preliminary objections and had not yet finally ruled on the
certification application. OPSEU v Colleges Compensation andAppointments Council, 2010 CanLII
55406 (ONLRB).
82. Fraserv Ontario(AG), 2008 ONCA 760, 92 OR (3d) 481, rev'd 2011 SCC 20, [2011] 2 SCR 3.
83. Agricultural Employees ProtectionAct, SO 2002, c 16 [AEPA].
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the Supreme Court had done its switch in BC Health, concluded that the
legislative response met the minimal requirements laid down in Dunmore.
By the time the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled on the matter, BC Health
had been released, and the Court of Appeal concluded that the freedom
of association protection for collective bargaining required a much more
extensive legislative intervention. The Court declared the AEPA invalid,
and ordered the legislature to provide agricultural workers with sufficient
protection to enable them to engage in meaningful collective bargaining.
This entailed the imposition of a duty to bargain in good faith, exclusive
bargaining rights for unions representing a majority of employees, and
a system of dispute resolution in the face of bargaining impasse and
for grievances arising under a collective agreement. This vision of the
requirements arising from extending freedom of association to collective
bargaining aroused a tremendous amount of discussion and critique.
Justice Winkler's opinion raised a variety of issues. First is whether
courts can order the legislature to engage in positive protection. Second,
his articulation of what an acceptable scheme appears to reproduce
most of the key elements of the Wagner Act model that is encapsulated
in the Ontario Labour Relations Act, which appears to be at odds with
the Supreme Court position that no 'particular' scheme of collective
bargaining was mandated by the Charter. Third, this typifies the fear
of some commentators, discussed above, about the appropriateness of
judges drafting labour codes. Nevertheless, even those who have that
fear are willing to concede the justice of having agricultural workers with
protections equal or equivalent to those provided to most other workers.
The Supreme Court responded by overturning Justice Winkler's
decision and holding that the AEPA provided adequate protection for
freedom of association.84 The majority opinion, jointly authored by Chief
Justice McLachlin and Justice LaBel, rejected a spirited concurring
opinion written by Justice Rothstein seeking to completely undo BC
Health and reinstate the Labour Trilogy and supporting jurisprudence
holding that freedom of association does not provide protection for strikes
or collective bargaining." Despite reaffirming freedom of association as
extending protection to collective bargaining, the majority gave a very
narrow reading of the extent of that protection. It reiterated yet again that
no particular statutory scheme of collective bargaining was protected,
84. Ontario (Attorney General) v Fraser, 2011 SCC 20, [2011] 2 SCR 3 [Fraser].
85. Ibid. Justice Rothstein was joined in his view that the Court should reverse its BC Health
decision by Justice Charron. Justice Deschamps also concurred in the result, but would have read the
BC Health protection for collective bargaining even more narrowly than the majority. Justice Abella
wrote a strong dissent that would have upheld the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal.
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and that the key to deciding whether the freedom has been violated
was to determine if there was a commitment to the duty to bargain in
good faith. Although the AEPA does not specifically refer to bargaining,
but only to an employer's obligation to listen to or read representations
made by an employees' association, the Court concluded that the AEPA
provided sufficient protections. It reached this conclusion in two steps.
First it reiterated that the form that collective bargaining rights take is
to be decided by the legislature," and, more controversially, that a right
to make representations is an adequate extension of collective bargaining
rights. Second, it decided that there is an implied statutory duty to consider
such representations in good faith. Indeed, the Court chided the union for
failing to make significant attempts to make the AEPA scheme work.
This decision has the potential to substantially limit claims by groups
arguing that their lack of access to collective bargaining protections is a
violation of their freedom of association. Whether it will have as much
impact with respect to the other issues that unions might seek to litigate,
such as limitations on subjects of bargaining, the legislative overruling of
collective agreements, or limits on the right to strike remains to be seen.
But it certainly changes the calculations for unions employing a litigation
strategy to extend collective bargaining rights to excluded groups. On
the positive side, the decision may act as a positive encouragement to
legislatures to explore innovative and novel representation schemes that
are better suited to the complex economic and social contexts within which
many vulnerable and precarious workers are imbricated.
2. Bargainingstructuresand restructuring
Several cases have explored the extent to which BC Health places
restrictions on government restructuring of public sector bargaining
structures. BC Health was itself a case in part about revised bargaining
structures, and at least two cases since have reviewed such legislative
initiatives. In Conf&rationdes syndicats nationauxv. Quebec (Procureur
general)" the Quebec Superior Court found that a sweeping legislated
restructuring of health sector bargaining units in Quebec violated the
guarantee of freedom of association, noting the lack of consultation with
the unions about the restructuring and the interference with freedom of
association arising from the intermingling of groups of employees sharing
86. Ibid at para 106. The majority was not deterred from this conclusion by the statement of the
Minister of Labour at the time the AEPA was introduced in the legislature, where he said that the
statute was not intended to extend collective bargaining to agricultural workers. The Supreme Court
rather disingenuously concluded that he was referring to Wagner-style collective bargaining, and was
not claiming that the AEPA did not provide for any form of collective bargaining.
87. Confederation des syndicats nationaux v Quebec (Procureurgendral), 2007 QCCS 5513 [CSNI.
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little community of interest. Perhaps most significant in terms of fitting
within the specific framework of the BC Health analysis was the finding
that the reorganization included restrictions on the negotiation of specific
subjects. It was this factor that led an Alberta court" to distinguish CSN
and conclude that the health sector bargaining unit restructuring carried
out in that province did not violate freedom of association. It rejected
the claim that freedom of association includes protection for employees
wishing to form smaller bargaining groups within the larger bargaining
units defined by the legislature.
This particular view, which seems consistent with BC Health, raises
interesting questions about majoritarian exclusivety which the Ontario
Court of Appeal in Fraser had required as part of a valid collective
bargaining scheme, but which did not seem to concern the Supreme
Court. As Langille has put it, "it seems to me that those jurisdictions
which deploy the notion of majoritarianism do not and cannot also have
"minoritarianism." 89 Somebody, other than the workers or the union, gets
to decide on the contours of the bargaining unit, whether it be a labour
relations board or the legislature.
3. Limiting the subjects of bargaining
In BC Health, the Supreme Court struck down parts of the challenged
legislation because it imposed terms and conditions and prohibited
unions and employers from bargaining about those matters, or agreeing to
collective agreement terms inconsistent with the imposed conditions. It is
not surprising, therefore, to see a number of challenges to similar efforts in
other statutory interventions. The Quebec healthcare restructuring struck
down in CSN provides one example. A second example is the successful
challenge by BC teachers to legislation that voided collective agreement
terms and prohibited bargaining on a range of issues. 90 Another challenge
to such legislation has been started by PIPS, objecting to many of the
limitations on bargaining set out in the federal Public Service Labour
RelationsAct.9 1Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada and
Public Service Alliance of Canada have also launched Charter challenges 92

88. AUPE vAlberta Health Services, 2010 ABQB 344, 491 AR 115.
89. Langille, supra note 67 at 125.
90. British Columbia Teahcers'Federation v British Columbia, 2011 BCSC 469.
91. See Notice ofApplication, PIPS v Canada (AG), I May 2008, online: Professional Institute
of the Public Service of Canada <http://www.pipsc.ca/portal/page/portal/website/issues/ constitution/
challenge-application.en.pdf>.
92. See Notice of Application, Gordon v Canada (AG) 27 April 2009, online: Equality Rights
<http://www.equalityrightscentral.com//papersdocs/20100628105956/IssuedNotice-of
Central
Application Apr 27_09 %28PSAC%29.pdf>.

44 The Dalhousie Law Journal
to the federal ExpenditureRestraint Act93 and the Public Sector Equitable
Compensation Act,94 the first of which imposed wage freezes on federal
public service workers, overriding negotiated collective agreements and
prospectively limiting bargaining on wages and benefits. The PublicSector
Equitable CompensationAct extensively regulated the processes by which
pay equity claims within the federal sector could be dealt with. In one case,
the Federal Court has ruled that the ERA imposition of a wage freeze done
without adequate consultation, constituted an unjustified infringement on
freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining.9 5 A much
more troubling reading of protection for collective bargaining was given
by a British Columbia court when it held that freedom of association does
not provide any protection against the ERA's overriding of collective
agreement terms imposed by arbitration as opposed to those reached by
collective bargaining. 6
An intriguing example ofthe potential constraints placed on government
by the expanded approach to freedom of association can be seen in Ontario,
which has statutorily imposed a wage freeze on non-unionized public sector
workers,97 but which to date is relying on a voluntary call for a freeze for
unionized workers, coupled with a threat to withhold funding increases
to a level to ensure that the employers do not agree to wage increases.
The speculation is that the government's bifurcated approach is a direct
result of concerns about the constitutionality of imposing a wage freeze on
unions.98 In the most recent stage of this process, there are two significant
developments. First, interest arbitrators are indicating an unwillingness to
defer to the government's call for a wage freeze.99 Second, the government
engaged in high-level consultations with employers and unions in order
to achieve some form of plan by which the government's goals might be
met.'00 Some unions were concerned that if those consultations failed to
lead to an agreement, they could be used as justification for the imposition

93. Budget Implementation Act, 2009, SC 2009, c 2, s 393.
94. Budget Implementation Act, ibid,s 394.
95. Meredith v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FC 735. Perhaps the most startling aspect of this
decision is the characterization of the process by which decisions were made on RCMP wages as a
collective bargaining relationship. Following the Supreme Court in Fraser,it emphasizes the right to
make representations and have them considered in good faith as the key to freedom of association.
96. FederalGovernment Dockyard Trades and Labour Council v Canada(Attorney General), 2011
BCSC 1210.
97. Public Sector Compensation Restraint to Protect Public Services Act, 2010, SO 2010, c I , Sch
24.
98. QP Briefing, Vol 1:24, 15 October 2010 (Toronto Star Intelligence Unit).
99. Robert Benzie & Rob Fergus6n, "Arbitrator rules against wage freeze, Liberals scoff' Toronto
Star (16 September 2010).
100. Robert Benzie, "Province's wage-freeze talks go off the rails" Toronto Star (26 August 2010).
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of statutory wage freeze for the unionized sector matching the freeze for
the non-unionized workers. The government strategy could be to argue
that even if there is a violation of freedom of association, the extensive
consultations show that no other means of achieving the objective is
available. ot

4. The right to strike
Adams also argues that a logical consequence of the commitment to
complying with international norms is that the Court must conclude that
there is a constitutionally protected right to strike. On that point there are
a number of commentators who appear to be in agreement. Etherington
espouses the view that the Supreme Court will eventually recognize
protection for a right to strike, albeit in some limited form.102 The Court
is likely to avoid case by case review of limits on striking by recognizing
the legitimacy of timing and support regulations, and accepting legislative
authority to substitute a right to strike with some other form of acceptable
dispute resolution such as interest arbitration. As a result, the Court would
intervene "only where strike activity was completely prohibited or so
severely restricted as to effectively deny access to a meaningful process
of collective bargaining."' 3 Jamie Cameron also argues that the logic of
BC Health should lead to the conclusion that a right to strike is protected,
but notes that the Court could hold to its former view that there was no
protection for strikes, but only by relying on unsound distinctions or
twisting existing doctrine in new directions.10 4
One Court of Appeal decision has found a Charter-based right
to strike, but concluded that the restrictions on the right to strike were
justified under a s. I analysis. 0 The British Columbia Teachers Federation
and the Health Employees Union had engaged in prohibited mid-contract
strikes to protest a series of legislative enactments, including the statute
reviewed in BC Health. The appellants challenged the definition of
strike in the British Columbia Labour Code which had been the basis
for an anticipatory Board declaration that the protest strikes would be a
violation of s. 57 of the Code. The Court of Appeal refused to engage in
an analysis under s. 2(d), but instead concluded that the prohibition on
101. As of January 2011, however, no such statutory freeze has been imposed.
102. Brian Etherington, "Does Freedom ofAssociation Under the Charter Include the Right to Strike
after BC Health? Prognosis, Problems and Concerns" (2010) 15 CLELJ 315.
103. Ibid at 330.
104. Jamie Cameron, "The Labour Trilogy's Last Rites: BC Health and a Constitutional Right to
Strike" (2010) 15 CLELJ 313.
105. British Columbia Teachers' Federation v British Columbia Public School Employers'Assn.,
2009 BCCA 39, 306 DLR (4th) 144.
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strikes violated the guarantee of freedom of expression. In doing so, it
suggested that public sector unions may be in a different position from
private sector ones. Public sector strikes inevitably target government and
public opinion and it is generally impossible to divide strike motivations
into political and collective bargaining categories. The Court concluded
that "the effect of the mid-contract strike prohibition is a restriction on
an effective means of expressive action and for that reason alone, it
trenches on the s. 2(b) guarantee of free expression."'O6 Nevertheless, the
Court refused to carve out, as the unions argued it should, through the
application of the minimal impairment test, a Charter-protected exception
to the ban on mid-contract strikes for peaceful, non-tortious, non-criminal
political strikes. It also rejected the view that there should be an exception
for political strikes that do not significantly affect the public interest. The
rejection was based on their view that either of these approaches provides
at best only a vague and indeterminate test for what is permitted and what
can be regulated. It raised the concern, expressed by Justice McIntyre in
the Alberta Reference, of avoiding judicial re-engagement in the control of
strikes and the desirability of deferring to the legislature in imposing limits
on strikes that avoid the exercise of judicial or administrative discretion.
5. Freedom of non-association
Brian Etherington raises the possibility that BC Health could provide the
basis for revisiting the extent to which freedom of non-association limits
various union security arrangements sanctioned by Canadian legislation. 07
He notes that the extensive reliance on international labour norms as a
basis for interpreting freedom of association could be extended to applying
those norms, with their relatively strong protection for freedom of nonassociation, to closed shop provisions and expenditure of union dues on
non-collective bargaining purposes. The willingness of the Court to do
so may be enhanced by its openness to revisiting legislative balances. He
concludes that Lavigne and Advance Cutting could get the same treatment
as the Labour Trilogy.
In relation to this, it is worth noting the startling decision of the Alberta
Labour Relations Board in U.EC W, Local 401 v. Old Dutch Foods
Ltd.18 reaching the opposite result. It held that the legislative failure to
require the inclusion of a Rand Formula in collective agreements violated
106. Ibid at para 37.
107. Brian Etherington, "The BC Health Services and Support Decision-The Constitutionalization
of a Right to Bargain Collectively in Canada: Where Did It Come From and Where Will It Lead?"
(2008) 30 Comp Labor Law & Pol'y J 715.
108. UFCW Local 401 v Old Dutch Foods Ltd (2009), 188 LAC (4th) 289, 171 CLRBR (2d) 1 [Old
Dutch].
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freedom of association, as the gap made it much more difficult for unions
to effectively organize and engage in collective bargaining. The Attorney
General initiated a judicial review. The union and the employer agreed
to include a Rand Formula in their collective agreement. The employer
therefore was not a party to the judicial review. The Attorney General and
the union reached agreement that the application for review should be
allowed on the grounds that the Board did not have jurisdiction to make
a declaration of constitutional invalidity. However, a number of affected
employees in the bargaining unit filed for intervenor or status, which the
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench granted.109 The Alberta Court of Appeal
has now ruled that the issue is moot and that there is no basis for giving
aggrieved employees intervenor status." 0 Nevertheless, the saga indicates
that there may be the possibility under the right circumstances, for arguing
the kind of claim Etherington foresaw.
6. Interpretationand Chartervalues
BC Health has also been invoked in a number of cases, usually by unions,
seeking sympathetic interpretation of specific statutory provisions. They
call on boards or court to use Chartervalues to aid in the interpretation
of statutory provisions. Although the Supreme Court has indicated in
a number of decisions that it is willing to consider Charter values in
assessing both common law rules and interpretive choices,"' it has
recently indicated it will not be particularly receptive to such claims in
relation to interpretation of collective bargaining statutes. In Plourde v.
Wal-Mart Canada Inc"2 the Court refused to reconsider its interpretation
of the Quebec Labour Code provision dealing with what constitutes a
good and sufficient for an employer dismissing employees. In particular,
the Court confirmed the position that a closing of a business provided
such a good and sufficient reason, and there was no basis under ss. 15
and 17 of the Code, protecting workers from discriminatory dismissals,
on which to look at the reason for the closing. In refusing to engage in a
Charter values analysis, the Court remarked that the entire Code "is the
embodiment and legislative vehicle to implement freedom of association
in the Quebec workplace. The Code must be read as a whole. It cannot be
correct that the Constitution requires that every provision (including s. 17)

109. Alberta (AG) v UFCW Local 401, 2010 ABQB 455.
110. Alberta (AG) v UFCW Local 401,2011 ABCA93, 502 AR 188.
111. Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 SCR 1130; Pepsi, supra note 34, and Health
Services, supra note 7.
112. Plourde v Wal-Mart Canada Inc, 2009 SCC 54, [2009] 3 SCR 465.
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must be interpreted to favour the union and the employees.""' Perhaps
more startling is the concern expressed about handing labour a "lopsided
advantage" because employees, bargaining through a union, can take
advantage of the freedom of association guarantee, whereas employers,
bargaining individually, cannot do so.
7. The role of labourboards adjudicatingCharterinvalidity
BC Health is generating considerably more work for labour relations
boards, who have been asked to assess the Charter validity of some of
the statutory provisions which they are mandated to enforce. Boards
have responded to the Charter arguments in some cases to the point of
determining that some provisions are invalid and cannot be enforced. For
example, the Quebec Commission des Relations du Travail has refused
to enforce the provisions of the Quebec collective bargaining statute that
precluded agricultural workers from being able to be represented by a union
pursuant to the statute." 4 The Ontario Labour Relations Board refused to
apply provisions of the statute that had the effect of stripping bargaining
rights from a union in the construction sector where the employer's
designation as a construction employer no longer accurately described the
nature of its business."I In Alberta, the Board went so far as to declare that
the failure to include Rand Formula protection in the collective bargaining
statute violates freedom of association. These cases continue to give hope
to unions that it is not only the ad hoc restrictions on collective bargaining
and the right to strike that may be subject to challenge." 6 They may be able
to chip away at many entrenched limitations that serve to hamper effective
collective bargaining.
Conclusion
Ultimately, unions' use of Charter litigation needs to be evaluated across
multiple dimensions. The review of issues in the proceeding section
demonstrates that such litigation in a post-BC Health world produces
some victories, but the extent of those victories remains to be seen. Giving
vulnerable workers access to collective bargaining regimes from which
they had previously been excluded is a small step towards a more just
world. But if the collective bargaining regimes themselves, whether they
are ones already created by legislation or ones mandated by judicial fiat,
113. Ibid at para 56.
114. Travailleurs et travailleuses unis de I'alimentation et du commerce, section locale 501 c
L'Ecuyer, 2010 QCCRT 191.
115. Independent ElectricityMarket Operatorv CanadianUnion ofSkilled Employees, [2009] OLRB
Rep November/December 826.
116. Old Dutch, supra note 108.

Collective Bargaining in the Shadow of the Charter Cathedral

49

do little to empower those vulnerable workers, the justice gains will be
small indeed.
There is little to instill confidence that the kinds of constitutional
interventions that we are seeing are likely to lead to a fundamental shift in
the decline of union density and the eclipsing of collective bargaining as
a central form of workplace governance. Even the BC Health decision did
not ultimately block the BC government's ability to impose many of the
costs of health care bargaining reform on vulnerable workers whose jobs
were contracted out and whose vested rights were substantially curtailed.
Other apparent victories also exemplify the narrowness of the gains. Two
years after Ontario college part-time workers were extended collective
bargaining rights, no certification order has yet been granted. Despite
the characterization of collective bargaining as a fundamental right,
the Supreme Court could still hold that Wal-Mart could close a store to
thwart unionization, without being held to account under the unfair labour
practice provisions of the Quebec Labour Code. The spectre that increased
judicial intervention in collective bargaining regimes may lead to more
robust protection for freedom of non-association is given some credence
in Old Dutch when the court opening a space for disenchanted workers to
intervene and argue that the imposition of a Rand Formula violates their
rights.
It does not seem likely that Charterintervention will lead to extensive
rewriting ofexisting labour codes. As Doorey points out,'" even if one could
invoke international norms to argue that the current regime regulating such
issues as union access to employer property are a violation of fundamental
rights, it is not likely that the courts will see these as sufficiently substantive
to intervene, or are likely to defer through as a section one analysis to
the existing legislative balancing. The Court's view in Plourde't " that the
legislative Code is the vehicle for embodying freedom of association in
practice suggests that the Court is still likely to be relatively deferential
to legislative choices. The pragmatic pluralists may celebrate such a
position, and it serves to remind unions that their potential for success
still depends extensively on being overtly political in pursuing their goals.
There may be some promise of litigation success in areas such as a right to
strike which, in Etherington's view of the logic of BC Health the Supreme
Court would have difficult avoiding." 9 This view of past and prospective
successes suggests that unions should indeed include Charterlitigation in
117. Supra note 62.
118. Supra note 112.
119. Supra note 102.
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their toolbox, not only for the specific gains that they might make in any
particular case, but as a way of focusing attention on collective bargaining
as a fundamental justice claim, and as a way of mobilizing workers in
other social and political spheres. But ultimately it is hard to avoid the
view that the Chartercathedral's influence on collective bargaining is not
likely to fundamentally alter basic structures of power and inequality, or
to counter the forces of globalization and economic restructuring that cast
even a longer shadow than does the Chartercathedral.

